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Abstract: 
For various reasons grounded in their articulation and conceptualization, objects and 
contentions can be inconceivable. Proper conceptualizing requires an adequate apprehension of 
meaning. But while there indeed are objects and contentions that are inconceivable to given 
individuals and groups, we (obviously) cannot give any concrete examples of items inconceivable to 
ourselves. 
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1. Conceiving facts 
For the most part we do not make facts: generally they are just “out there,” beyond our reach 
and control. All that we can do is to think about them. But alike in making and in thinking about 
them we must have a conception of the facts. 
The human mind has two principal cognitive powers: to image possibilities and to adjudge 
realities, enabling it to deal with fact and fiction alike. In a way possibility-management is the more 
fundamental. After all if its’s not possible then it can’t possibly be real, and if it’s not conceivable by 
us then we can’t possibly accept it as actual. (All this is not, however, to say that if we cannot conceive 
of it that it can’t be actual—reality and possibility alike can hold very big surprises for us.) 
Conceivability is a matter of the possibilities that people are in a position to contemplate given 
the concepts and beliefs at their disposal. It relates to both facts and fictions. A four-side triangle is 
inconceivable, one that is small and red is not. The concepts and beliefs at our disposal set our 
conceptual horizons. They delimit the range of our cognitive domain beyond which there lies what 
is, for us, mere terra incognita. 
Epistemologists have focused on our knowledge of the real and have pretty well left possibility 
to the logicians. But the logicians have left the epistemology of possibility to others: their concern 
has been with what actually is possible, and have omitted concern for how we conduct the 
applicative business of leaning and reasoning about it. The present discussion will offer some 
comments on this rather neglected theme. 
Conceivability calls for being available as an object of meaningful thought. It is not a matter 
of imagining or picturing. One cannot picture or imagine thousand-sided polygon but can certainly 
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conceive in describing it and supposing its possibility. Conceivability is sometimes mis-equated to 
understandability based on an insufficient knowledge. (“I cannot conceive how she came to realize 
that he disliked her—he was such a good actor.” Here you can certainly conceive of its being so: it is 
just that you don’t know how it came to be.) 
Some conceptions have to be formed systematically—they ramify out into related issues 
whose co-understanding they presuppose. To have a proper conception of a propeller one needs 
some understanding of the technology of early airplanes; To have a proper conception of an electron 
one need some understanding of subatomic physics. 
As construed here, conceivability is the prospect of entertaining something as a meaningful 
possibility. Two sorts of items can be inconceivable to a person: things and facts. A thing is 
effectively inconceivable to someone if its definitive features are wholly outside that person’s 
experience. (A Polynesian cannot conceive of solid water (i.e., ice), Aristotle could not conceive of 
X-rays.) A fact is inconceivable to someone when they have totally unshakable belief in its contrary. 
(Pigs that can fly like bats or bees are inconceivable to most of us.) For individuals the personally 
inconceivable is either (or both) foreign to established experience or contrary to absolutely certain 
conviction. 
The truths we contemplate may well not actually characterize reality, but rather be related to 
its constitution in more complex and indirect ways. For example we can have: 
 
• negative truths (“No cats talk.”) 
• vague truths (“He looked thirtyish.”) 
• inexact truths (“It looks something like this.”) 
• approximate truth (“the table is roughly 32 inches wide.”) 
• indefinite truths (“She looked pleased.”) 
• possibilistic truths (“It might rain.”) 
• impressionistic truths (“They were lucky.”) 
• metaphorical truths (“It was a veritable bonanza.”) 
 
No doubt such truths will be so in virtue of what the facts are. But they certainly do not 
characterize the real facts. Thus truths can be indefinite. But reality cannot; It must be concrete 
(rather than an abstract), definite (rather than vague, approximate, etc.), and positive (rather than 
negative), whereas truths need not be any of these. Thus truths do not correspond to what the realities 
are, although their being truths is (loosely) dependent upon it of that. All truths have their “truth-
makers” in reality—that is, there is (and must be) a “basis in concrete fact” for every truth—an aspect 
of reality in virtue of which that truth is true. 
To characterize reality—to “agree” with it—would be to give an accurate representation of it 
that is correct and complete in all relevant detail. Thus only a detailed (precise, exact, accurate) 
account of something can actually correspond to the reality of it. And this is something which our 
Nicholas Rescher - Conceivability  
10 
language-framed statements about the real—however true—almost invariably fail to achieve. An 
account that is vague, imprecise, approximate, fuzzy, or the like may well be true but nevertheless 
not be accurately consonant with it. The truth in general falls well short of the detailed accuracy that 
would be required here. No doubt the truth is grounded in reality, and concurs with it. But it 
certainly need not and often will not correspond to it. 
Seeing that our true contentions regarding reality are generally indefinite (vague, ambiguous, 
metaphorical, etc.) whereas reality itself is always definite (precise, detailed, concrete), it follows that 
those truths of ours do not—cannot—give an adequate (faithful, accurate, precisely correct) 
account or representation of reality. It is a merciful fact of life in human communication that truth 
can be told without the determinative detail of precision, accuracy, and the like, required for an 
accurate representation of the facts. Reality’s detail involves more than we can generally manage. We 
can achieve the truth and nothing but the truth, but the whole truth about something is always 
beyond our grasp. 
There was a time when it was fashionable for English Hegelian philosophers such as Bernard 
Bosanquet to say that only the accurate truth is the real truth and that the real truth of things must 
be altogether exact and fully detailed. But this contention would involve us in critical errors of 
omission regarding reality. Thus we would not be able to declare the truth that grass is green or the 
sky is blue. And moreover we would lose the crucial principles that the logico-conceptual 
consequences of the truth must also be true, seeing that the inference from “There are 48 people in 
the room” to its vague logical consequence “There are several dozen people in the room” would now 
not qualify as correct, since the later would not qualify as a truth. The truth is one thing, and the 
precise truth or the exact truth quite another.1 Our truths need surely not convey the detailed nature 
of the realities that make them so. But in the end we cannot come to cognitive grips with realty save 
via our true acceptance about it. 
 
2. Inconceivability 
Certain considerations may be inconceivable to someone owing to having mistaken ideas on 
the subject or because certain matters do not fall within the range of their experience. This sort of 
subjective (person-relative) inconceivability is not at issue here. We are here concerned only with 
inconceivability relative to meaningful conceptions and correct convictions, matters inconceivable 
on the basis of correct and adequate information. 
And there is also the impersonal or generic conceivability characteristic of the typical and 
representative members of the group. Generic inconceivability is not a matter of what a particular 
individual can manage in thought but of what can be managed in rational thought as such. Items 
that are inconceivable include a greatest integer, a fastest motion, a largest circle—thing whose very 
identification include a contradiction in terms. But either way personal or generic, conceivability 
requires experiential access and consonant belief.  
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We must, however, distinguish between subjectively person-relative conceivability, which is a 
function of a particular individuals knowledge and objective or culture-relative conceivability which 
is a function of language and cognitive state of the art. Both alike set limits but they differ in that the 
former are personal and the latter societal. From the theoretical point of view it is the latter that are 
paramount, and our focus will be on groups rather than individuals, and principles rather than 
people. 
There are three principal levels of inconceivability/conceivability: 
 
I. Grammatical. Meaningless gibberish: having not informative sense (“Twas brillig . . .”) 
Violation: Meaninglessness. 
 
II. Logico-Conceptual. At odds with what is to be seen as absolutely necessary. (“A day without 
hours; a four-sided triangle; a sphere without a center.”) Violation: Incoherence. 
 
III. Factual. Inconsistent with what is seen as a patent and necessary fact. “A talking tree; a 
brass banana.” Violation: Unacceptability. 
 
Rather different modes of necessity/possibility are at issues with II and III. No. II deals with 
absolute or logico-conceptual necessity/possibility ( and ). This is the way in which it is necessary 
for triangles to have vertices or a bird to have wings. By contrast, III is the way in which it is necessary 
for animals to secure nourishment in order to survive or for fires to have oxygen in order to burn. 
These envision the sort of necessity involved in accommodating to the workings of the actual world 
( and ). In this sense of the term the basic laws of nature provides the basis for necessity. 
One cannot or course give an illustrative example of something that is in principle 
inconceivable because presenting it defeats the very purpose. 
And inconceivable theses cannot sensibly be maintained as informative truths, they can only 
be maintained, if at all, as suppositions or hypothesis. In failing to make tenable assertions and 
convey a meaningful message they fail to fall under the descriptivity of correct/incorrect (and 
similarly probable, plausible, and the like). Its unintelligibility precludes it from qualifying for those 
evaluative assessments which—like the proceeding—are applicable only to propositions able to 
make a coherent claim of some sort. And only meaningful propositions (claims) can have a truth 
status—be it actually or even by assumption or supposition. Incomprehensible (and thereby 
meaningless) discourse cannot even be assured to be true or false. Its lack of truth status is 
unconditional and unavoidable. 
In actual fact claims to the realization of something inconceivable are always untenable and 
false. However here as elsewhere error is possible. Someone ill-informed can certainty think 
(mistakenly) that something inconceivable is real. It is clear that something can be acceptable to one 
person and not to another. Thus when one person is better informed than another they can differ 
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in regard to conceivability—either way. If x does not realize that squaring the circle is impossible he 
mistakenly conceive of someone (perhaps himself) having solved the problem. On the other hand if 
x does not realize that black swans are possible, he may mistakenly regard the prospect of a black-
swan dinner as inconceivable. 
 
3. Meaninglessness 
Logic deals with the truth-relationships among propositions. But before there is truth there 
must be meaning. And the bête noir in this regard is meaninglessness. 
Meaninglessness is a malfunction of communication, something that results when our 
apparatus of communication does not manage to do its intended job. 
There are several importantly distinct ways in which a statement can be meaningless, although 
all of them are alike in basing what is said on a presupposition that is simply false. 
One mode of meaninglessness results from asserting absolute gibberish. “The number three 
ate yellow.” We cannot even begin to make sense of this. This is assertoric meaninglessness, the failure 
to make any intelligible contention whatsoever. The mistaken presupposition here is that 
meaninglessness can be achieved simply by stringing words together grammatically. The 
senselessness of such gibberish that one can make neither heads nor tails of is the most drastic mode 
of meaningless. All of its other modes are at least minimally intelligible in that what is being said is 
sufficiently intelligible that one can comprehend the senselessness of it. 
A prime form of such meaninglessness is categorial in nature and consists in ascribing to 
something a certain type some feature that items of its category simply cannot have, as for example 
assigning a physical location to numbers (one cannot position the number three at the North Pole) 
or ascribing a color to obligations (one cannot have a yellow duty toward one’s children). 
A further form of meaninglessness is conceptual in making statements that conflict with the 
established meaning of words. Thus consider such statements as “John’s spouse is unmarried” or 
“Two’s double is an odd number.” 
Then too, meaninglessness obtains when any attempt to class a statement either as true or as 
false results in failure because a contradiction results either way. This is alethic meaninglessness, the 
failure to have any determinate truth status. The classically paradoxical self-contradictory thesis 
“This statement is false” is an example. 
Yet another mode of meaninglessness is the delusional which presupposes as existent 
something that just is not there. Examples are such statements as “The present king of France is bald” 
or “Noplace is the capital of Antarctica.” 
A further pathway to meaninglessness is by purporting the existence of something that not 
only does not but actually cannot exist. “The prime number between five and seven.” or “The 
product of three multiplied by an even divisor of seven” are examples. This is referential 
meaninglessness, rooted in the in-principle unavoidable nonexistence something that the statements 
purport to characterize. 
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Why is it that meaninglessness statements can and should be dismissed from serious 
consideration without much further ado? We do so for reasons of cognitive economy. We thereby 
spare ourselves from any further fruitless effort to deal with the matter. 
Are self-contradictory statements meaningless? It all depends. Individually self-contradictory 
statements are indeed meaningless. There is nothing we can do with such statements as “The pair of 
them consisted of three items.” But by way of contrast consider the example of the three boxes I, II, 
III: 
 III 
       I         II 
                                                   S1              S2 
 
Now let it be that that S1 is: 
 
The statement in Box II is true, but some statement in Box III is false. 
 
Suppose S1 is true. Then so (according to S1 itself) is S2. But with S1 and S2 both true, all the 
statements in Box III are true, so S1 is false. Since S1-true entails S1-false, S1 is self-contradictory and 
thus false. 
S1’s falsity means that not-S1 will be true. But by the content of S1 we have: 
 
~S1 iff ~S2 v [S1 & S2] 
 
Since S1 & S2 is inescapably false by the reasoning indicated above, we have: ~S1 iff ~S2. So the 
falsity of S1 constrains that of S2. That is, S2 will be false irrespective of what it is that S2 asserts. But 
this is absurd and we can make no stable sense of this paradoxical situation. 
It must be stressed, however, that those individual sentences S1 and S2 are not really 
meaningless. After all, their meaning is essential to the derivation of the paradox. Moreover, if you 
change one of them, the other can become perfectly meaningful. What is meaningless here is the 
whole complex—the entirety of what is being asserted. The difficulty of meaningful construal is 
collective not distributive. Individually regarded the meaningfulness of those statements is 
incontestable. 
A very special sort of purported lack of “meaning” is at issue with the “empirical 
meaninglessness” purported by the logical positivists of the 1930s. For them, a proposition was 
“meaningless” in the sense of failing to admit of observational disinformation. In adopting this line, 
they thought they could demolish traditional metaphysics by dismissing it as meaningless nonsense. 
Unfortunately, for this program, it came to light all too soon that a whole host of perfectly 
meaningful scientific statements would have to be classed as empirically meaningless, so that the 
baby was being thrown out along with the bath water. For it is clear that discursive verification will 
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be unavailable with statements about the remote past or future, or such generalizations as “X will 
never happen” or “Caesar would have left the Rubicon uncrossed had he wanted to” and many other 
sorts of statements whose meaning is intelligible and whose truth is plausible.2 
It is tempting to dismiss as meaningless those claims that we simply do not understand—to 
blame the message, as it were, for our own lack of comprehension. Many or most of us would not 
hesitate to adopt this line in relation to the explanation that Chinese adepts of acupuncture use in 
explaining their practice. And while such an argument may well be appropriate, one should 
nevertheless proceed with caution in these matters. For it is one of the most fundamental facts of 
epistemology that to those who proceed at a lesser level of understanding the proceedings of their 
higher-level interlocations are bound to seem like magic, and that the discussion promising technical 
experts unable seems gibberish to the uninitiated.  
As already noted, meaninglessness is a mode of malfunction. And as such it is a phenomenon 
that is both inevitable and instructive. It is inevitable because anything that can be used can also be 
misused. And it is instructive because in looking to the boundaries between the potential pursue of 
an instrumentality we shed light on the nature of its proper use. 
 
4. The corrigibility of conceptions 
It must be stressed that these deliberations regarding cognitive inadequacy are less concerned 
with the correctness of our particular claims about real things than with our characterizing 
conceptions of them. And in this connection it deserves stressing that there is a significant and 
substantial difference between a true or correct statement or contention on the one hand, and a true 
or correct conception on the other. To make a true contention about a thing we merely need to get 
one particular fact about it straight. To have a true conception of the thing, on the other hand, we 
must get all of the important facts about it straight. And it is clear that this involves a certain 
normative element—namely what the “important” or “essential” facets of something are. 
Anaximander of Miletus presumably made many correct contentions about the sun in the 
fifth century B.C.—for example, that its light is brighter than that of the moon. But Anaximander’s 
conception of the sun (as the flaming spoke of a great wheel of fire encircling the earth) was totally 
wrong. 
To assure the correctness of our conception of a thing we would have to be sure—as we very 
seldom are—that nothing further can possibly come along to upset our view of just what its 
important features are and just what their character is. Thus, the qualifying conditions for true 
conceptions are far more demanding than those for true claims. With a correct contention about a 
thing, all is well if we get the single relevant aspect of it right, but with a correct conception of it we 
must gel the essentials right—we must have an overall picture that is basically correct. And this is 
something we generally cannot ascertain, if only because we cannot say with secure confidence what 
actually is really important or essential before the end of the proverbial day. 
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With conceptions—unlike propositions or contentions—incompleteness means 
incorrectness, or at any rate presumptive incorrectness. Having a correct or adequate conception of 
something as the object it is requires that we have all the important facts about it right. But since the 
prospect of discovering further important facts can never be eliminated, the possibility can never be 
eliminated that matters may so eventuate that we may ultimately (with the wisdom of hindsight) 
acknowledge the insufficiency or even inappropriateness of our earlier conceptions. A conception 
based on incomplete data must be assumed to be at least partially incorrect. If we can decipher only 
half an inscription, our conception of its overall content must be largely conjectural—and thus must 
be presumed to contain an admixture of error. When our information about something is 
incomplete, obtaining an overall picture of the thing at issue becomes a matter of theorizing, or 
guesswork, however sophisticatedly executed. And then we have no alternative but to suppose that 
this overall picture falls short of being wholly correct in various (unspecifiable) ways. With 
conceptions, falsity can thus emerge from errors of omission as well as those of commission, resulting 
from the circumstance that the information at our disposal is merely incomplete, rather than actually 
false (as would have to be the case with contentions). 
To be sure, an inadequate or incomplete description of something is not thereby false—the 
statements we make about it may be perfectly true as far as they go. But an inadequate or incomplete 
conception of a thing is ipso facto one that we have no choice but to presume to be incorrect as well,3 
seeing that where there is incompleteness we cannot justifiably take the stance that it relates only to 
inconsequential matters and touches notion important. Accordingly, our conceptions of particular 
things are always to be viewed not just as cognitively open-ended but as corrigible as well. 
We are led back to the thesis of the great idealist philosophers (Spinoza, Hegel, Bradley, Royce) 
that human knowledge inevitably falls short of “perfected science” (the Idea, the Absolute), and 
must be presumed deficient both in its completeness and its correctness.4 
 
5. A “logic” of inconceivability 
The notion of a “logic of inconceivability” would seem to be a contradiction in terms. For 
logic looks to what must (or cannot) be true if something related is accepted (or rejected) as such. It 
deals in relationships among claims in the face of their actual status as true or false—be it actual of 
assumptive. Any discussion which by virtue of inconceivability lacks a definite truth-status falls 
outside logic as traditionally conceived. 
There are, however, some cognate issues. To facilitate our deliberations we shall assume that 
our person variables x, y, z etc. will range over limited—that is, finite—intelligences at the level of 
homo sapiens. And we shall adopt the convention that: 
 
Cp abbreviates “p is conceivable,” that is it is possible for a human of ordinary intelligence to 
access the meaning of p; and Cxp abbreviates “p is conceivable to x.” 
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Given that Cxp abbreviates “x’s having a meaningful conception of p,” we will have it that: 
 
Cp = p is conceivable = (x)Cxp 
 
And note that this neither states nor entails (x)Cxp. The conceivability at issue need not be 
realizable by some actual person. Also, when one can conceive of p one can conceive of not-p as well, 
with the result that Cxp iff Cx~p. (And note, moreover, that by using  rather than  in equating 
Cp with (x)Cxp we take purely theoretical rather than effectively practical conceivability into 
view.) 
An assertion may be made with or without affirmative intent. In the former (deliberately 
affirmative) case the object is to endorse what the assertion maintains, in the second (merely 
deliberative) case the object is only to pose the assertion as an item of consideration. 
In the context of the present deliberations the assertions represented by the variables p, q, r, 
etc. are also to encompass those made in the merely deliberative rather than substantively affirmative 
mode. An assertion so made is not being stated as a true affirmation, but merely put forward for 
consideration. And since the range of our assertion-variables, p, q, r, etc. encompasses conceivable 
proposition in general, so that assertions come to be coordinate with conceivability rather than 
actual truth. In the context of the present deliberations we thus do not have the Tarski equivalence: 
 
p iff p = T. 
 
Instead all we have is: 
 
If p then Cp, though not always conversely, since we have: 
 
Cp  (x)Cxp 
 
There now follows: 
 
~Cp  (x)~Cxp and thereby also ~Cp  (x)~Cx~p 
 
Accordingly, that which is inherently inconceivable must be so of necessity for anyone. 
It transpires that any claims whose prerequisites or consequence are inconceivable will 
themselves qualify as such. Thus p ├ q and Cp, then C(q); and also if p ├ q and Cq, then ~Cq. (As 
usual, ├ here represents logico-conceptual entailment.) Moreover impossible or impossibility-
entailing claims are not conceivable: 
 
If p ├ q & ~q, then ~Cxp  
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These principles provide for the rudiments of a quasi-logic of conceivability. 
 
6. Inconceivable possibilities 
But are there actually—can there really be—such things as inconceivable objects, facts, or 
possibilities? Of course one cannot provide examples. But it is clear on general principles that such 
items must exist. For we humans have to conduct our conceptualizing business by means of 
language. And more linguistic formulation is a recursive process—explanatory claims for a finite 
vocabulary via finite grammatical principles—we can realize at most a denumerable number of 
experience. But there is no good reason to think that items, facts, and possibilities are not similarly 
limited. So—as in Musical Chairs—when the music of language stops there will yet remain 
unaccommodated possibilities. The range of what is theoretically conceivable outnumbers the reach 
of what can possibly be realized. 
And so the idea of identificatory vagrancy considered in the preceding chapter comes into play 
at this point. We can conceive and indeed be convinced that there is an integer no-one ever 
specifically thinks of; but of course we cannot conceive of this integer as the specific individual it is. 
Moreover actually conceiving of things is something personal and potentially idiosyncratic. 
But conceivability as such is something impersonal and objective inherent in the nature of the issues 
involved and the possibilities of conceptual operation. And even as a chasm may be bridgeable 
without ever being bridged, so an idea or circumstance may be conceivable without ever being 
conceived of. Conceivability is a matter of the possibilities of conceptualization: what actually 
happens within the contingent eventuations of the real world is irrelevant. What individuals can 
manage to conceive of in practice is a fraction of their range of experience. But what is conceivable 
in principle is something above and beyond the capabilities of individuals. 
But would there actually be a bridgeable chasm if no bridge were ever built—and indeed if the 
very idea of a bridge were never even conceived of? The answer is of course affirmative. The domain 
of possibility— possibilities of bridging and conceiving included—is independent of and detached 
from what actually happens in the world. The bridges we build and the concepts we entertain are 
products of our doings. But the associated possibilities of things are independent of us. Of course 
the contemplation and entertainment of these possibilities is a matter of reality and actualization. 
But not so with the possibilities themselves that are at issue. It is noteworthy and significant that we 
possess a faculty of imaginative thought that enable us to enter a realm of abstract possibilities whose 
being we do not produce and whose features we discover rather than create. Like the real word itself, 
the realm of possibility that lies open to our conception is not of our making but is an independent 
manifold that we can contemplate but not produce. What we do conceive of is up to us, but what 
we can conceive of is not. 
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Appendix 
An assertion may be made with or without affirmative intent. In the former (deliberatively 
affirmative) case the object is to endorse what the assertion maintains, in the second (merely 
deliberative) case the object is to make it an object of consideration. 
In the context of the present deliberations the assertions represented by the variables p, q, r, 
etc. are to include statements made in the merely deliberative rather than specifically affirmative 
mode. An assertion so stated is not being denied as a true affirmation but merely put forward for 
consideration. In this context the Tarski equivalence 
 
p iff p = T 
 
does not hold. For this deliberative contention may turn out to be inconceivable and meaningless. 
Any statement that has a definite truth value as T or F (rather than an indecisive tertium datur) 
must be conceivable, and conversely. 
Thus 
 
(1) Cp iff (p = T v p = F) 
 
But suppose we were to adopt the Tarski Principle that 
 
p iff p = T  (and correspondingly ~p iff p = F) 
 
Then of course (1) will come to 
 
Cp iff (p v ~p) 
 
This would entail (p)Cp. In view of our determination to accept even meaningless claims as 
objects of consideration this result is inacceptable. Thus the implementability of this result betokens 
a determination but it postulates that the present diagram be limited to conceivable propositions. In 
the context of the present deliberations the Tarski Principle must be put into suspension. 
 
Endnotes: 
1. For relevant material see also the author’s Metaphysics: The Key Issues From a Realistic Perspective 
(Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 2006), pp. 101-104. 
2. See C. G. Hempel, “Problems and Changes in the Empiricists Criterion of Meaning.” Révue 
Internationale de Philosophie, vol.  4 (1950), pp. 41-63. 
3. Compare F. H. Bradley’s thesis: “Error is truth, it is partial truth, that is false only because partial and 
left incomplete” Appearance and Reality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893), p. 169. 
4. The author’s Empirical Inquiry (Totowa NJ: Rowman & Littlefield, 1982) discusses further relevant 
issues. 
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